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authorMatt Holt <[email protected]>2023-08-02 11:13:52 -0600
committerGitHub <[email protected]>2023-08-02 11:13:52 -0600
commitf66493efef4d909fdeb68a2ce8131d58e17333b3 (patch)
tree708db84035c22ba9c676293ad3b965d6b7c8bc4e /admin.go
parent5c51c1db2ce450a3fa003834097ad010b3844673 (diff)
downloadcaddy-f66493efef4d909fdeb68a2ce8131d58e17333b3.tar.gz
caddy-f66493efef4d909fdeb68a2ce8131d58e17333b3.zip
core: Allow loopback hosts for admin endpoint (fix #5650) (#5664)
Diffstat (limited to 'admin.go')
-rw-r--r--admin.go25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/admin.go b/admin.go
index 4a1d23b60..1966556a5 100644
--- a/admin.go
+++ b/admin.go
@@ -318,7 +318,32 @@ func (admin AdminConfig) allowedOrigins(addr NetworkAddress) []*url.URL {
// messages. If the requested URI does not include an Internet host
// name for the service being requested, then the Host header field MUST
// be given with an empty value."
+ //
+ // UPDATE July 2023: Go broke this by patching a minor security bug in 1.20.6.
+ // Understandable, but frustrating. See:
+ // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/60374
+ // See also the discussion here:
+ // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/61431
+ //
+ // We can no longer conform to RFC 2616 Section 14.26 from either Go or curl
+ // in purity. (Curl allowed no host between 7.40 and 7.50, but now requires a
+ // bogus host; see https://superuser.com/a/925610.) If we disable Host/Origin
+ // security checks, the infosec community assures me that it is secure to do
+ // so, because:
+ // 1) Browsers do not allow access to unix sockets
+ // 2) DNS is irrelevant to unix sockets
+ //
+ // I am not quite ready to trust either of those external factors, so instead
+ // of disabling Host/Origin checks, we now allow specific Host values when
+ // accessing the admin endpoint over unix sockets. I definitely don't trust
+ // DNS (e.g. I don't trust 'localhost' to always resolve to the local host),
+ // and IP shouldn't even be used, but if it is for some reason, I think we can
+ // at least be reasonably assured that 127.0.0.1 and ::1 route to the local
+ // machine, meaning that a hypothetical browser origin would have to be on the
+ // local machine as well.
uniqueOrigins[""] = struct{}{}
+ uniqueOrigins["127.0.0.1"] = struct{}{}
+ uniqueOrigins["::1"] = struct{}{}
} else {
uniqueOrigins[net.JoinHostPort("localhost", addr.port())] = struct{}{}
uniqueOrigins[net.JoinHostPort("::1", addr.port())] = struct{}{}